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Resistance and Power in a Security Certification Scheme: The Case Of c:cure 
Abstract 
Using the lens of Clegg’s Circuits of Power (CoP) framework, this study examines the resistance 
to a UK information security certification scheme through three episodes of power that led to its 
withdrawal in 2000. The UK authorities sought to generate market competition between a generic 
certificate scheme with lower costs and international recognition and one based on technical 
rigor, but they failed in their objectives because of resistance from organizational players. This 
paper makes contributions to the understanding of the discursive nature of resistance to change in 
the research of standards and certification, and contributes to the literature by formulating the 
concept of discourse resilience: the property of discourses to resist change. It identifies the non-
agentic nature of resistance in the absence of coercive power and presents a reflection on 
legitimacy as a required attribute for the acceptance of a certificate scheme. The research finds 
that what organizations deem to be legitimate is the result of power. 
 
Keywords:  Information security certification, circuits of power, resistance, qualitative research 
1. Introduction 
 
Information security standards and certification schemes have played a significant role in helping 
organizations safeguard information assets against a variety of internal and external threats. One 
example is the first security standard for information systems - BS 7799 – which evolved into an 
international standard now known as ISO/IEC 27002. In this sense, Barnard and von Solms [5] 
discuss the importance of BS 7799 and its certifications for securing e-commerce practices 
while Gomes and Velez [35] highlight their value in the Health Sector.  With the emergence of 
new technologies such as cloud computing and biometrics there is a constant need to formulate 
national and international national standards in the field of information technology security (see 
[64]).  However, Brunsson et al. [11] argue that “the development of standards is often a political 
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and conflict-laden process” involving a variety of players from different domains with different 
interests, such as government authorities, certification agencies, experts and potential standard 
adopters. From the literature, we learn that security standards can have an impact on 
organizational information security practices [71, 6]. Hence, we argue that by studying the 
processes that bring standards and their respective certification schemes into being we are able to 
understand the content and practices associated with their implementation (e.g. [3, 11]).  Such 
findings can bring theoretical and practical knowledge to those developing information security 
policy and security standards for the next period. 
This research investigates an early attempt by industry stakeholders to implement a certification 
scheme, known as c:cure,  for the information security management standard BS7799 in the UK. 
In discussing the importance and dynamics of standards and certification schemes, prior studies 
of certification predominantly using economics as research theory range from market penetration 
strategy [6,9,69], the economics of user involvement [19,28], and its relationship with 
institutional and technological change [2,74]. Overall, the economic perspective assumes that the 
motivation for standardization arises from the economic and strategic incentives in market 
penetration and diffusion [27]: organizations make rational choices when choosing to obtain 
certification, weighing up the balance of cost and benefit.  
Nonetheless, critics have questioned the mechanistic and hegemonic view of certification, which 
was dominant in the economic approach [8, 84].  Brunsson et al. [11] argue that from the 
perspective of organization studies, standardization is “essentially a dynamic phenomena” where 
tension and conflicts among different interest groups are most likely to emerge during the 
creation, promotion and distribution process. IS scholars have also demonstrated the political 
nature of various information technology standardization processes [37,56].  Therefore, in this 
research, we align our theoretical position with these researchers, and draw on Clegg’s Circuits of 
Power (hereafter CoP) framework to examine the complex social and political interactions 
embedded in the process of developing the certification scheme. This gives rise to our research 
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questions: 1) what is the role of power in influencing the rejection or acceptance of standards 
certification scheme? 2) what are the theoretical lessons that can be learnt from this particular 
case? To address the research questions, we first examine the literature on standardization with a 
particular focus on the perspective of power and resistance. We then discuss the theory chosen to 
support the analysis: Clegg’s [16] Circuits of Power (CoP).  After this, we present our case in 
three key episodes. Each episode is followed by an analysis in terms of CoP. There follows a 
discussion formulating the main conceptual contributions of the analysis and reviewing their 
implications vis-à-vis the literature. The paper concludes with reflection on the scope and value 
of our research. 
 
2. Power, Resistance and Standardization 
In the IS security literature, the dominant research work on information security policy has 
concerned the organizational level including studies on end-user security policy compliance [73, 
17, 40] and the role of management support and organizational culture [44, 47]. While these 
studies enhance our knowledge with respect to organizational and behavioral aspects of 
information security policy implementation, we found that only a few researchers have looked 
beyond the organizational boundary to examine the origin of industry-wide information security 
standardization. For instance, Backhouse et al. [3] draws on the CoP to examine the negotiation 
and interaction among different agencies during the BS 7799 development in the UK. Their study 
explains how exogenous contingencies triggered the need for security standards and identifies 
how power relations bind the different actors so they form alliances which eventually engender 
the legitimacy of the certification scheme, which the authors found, was crucial for the standard 
development. Their findings indicate that success relies heavily on making the certification 
scheme an obligatory passage for all relevant industry actors which required the realignment of 
political interests and decisions [13]. Others have drawn from institutional perspectives to discuss 
the effect of regulatory authority and industry competitors on the organizational adoption of 
information security policy [43,44].  These studies tend to concentrate on the role of professional 
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and certification bodies. The purpose of our paper is not to reject or invalidate alternative 
approaches to studying standards but to complement them by adding a power perspective. 
Accordingly, to identify the complexities of engaging multiple parties in standardization, we 
review the literature studying power and politics, and in particular the roles these play in forming 
the consensus and fostering the legitimacy which are essential during standardization processes 
[14,27,77] 
Even though organizational researchers have not concentrated specifically on aspects of 
resistance to and rejection of standards and their certification, some of them have focused on 
power-related phenomena such as resources, stakeholders’ relations and negotiations. For 
example, Boström [10] discusses the importance of power resources for standards organizations 
in achieving credibility and authority, and the problem of the power shift resulting from the 
imbalance of power among key actors. In particular, he highlights the value of symbolic 
resources in maintaining moral legitimacy during the standard setting process. Fransen and Kolk 
[33] argue that multi-stakeholder standards can offer a more effective power balance among 
business and social representative of interest groups. Nunez-Nickel and Gutierrez [58] 
demonstrate the relevance of the political context in influencing the performance of independent 
professionals. Similarly, Dokko et al. [22] challenge the assumption of technological determinism 
of diffusion and argue that shaping and selecting technological standards is mediated through the 
social process of negotiation, debate and interaction between the participating organizations. 
Drawing on negotiated order theory, they demonstrate the dynamic interaction between 
technological change and social order.  
Thus, while several studies have pointed to aspects of power in standard creation and the 
subsequent implications [3,80,77,9], the concept of resistance, especially discursive resistance, 
has not been extensively discussed,. The term discursive resistance is used here in the Foucaultian 
[30, 31,32] sense denoting resistance to knowledge conveyed in symbolic form. We argue that 
this type of resistance is relevant when agencies proposing certification schemes have no access 
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to power in the form of authority or other disciplinary resource. Therefore, we argue by drawing 
on the literature in management control and organization studies that resistance is an important 
part of analyzing standards creation, since the failure to identify and manage it can have an 
impact on the acceptance or rejection of the associated certification scheme.  We explain below 
the concept of resistance and its relevance to this research.  
In sociological studies researchers have conceptualized resistance in power relationships as the 
opposite of induction [65]. Induction in this context means asking someone to do something he or 
she would not do of his or her own will [18]. Induction is normally interpreted as positive power 
while resistance is perceived as the source of negative power [16].  This notion of resistance as 
negative power has been, for example, the conventional approach to theorizing labor resistance to 
management control [76,68,50].  Fleming and Sewell [26] argue that earlier literature on 
resistance primarily focuses on the analysis of observable resistance such as official strikes and 
worker protests, and ignores the informal aspects of resistance such as meaning and routines [60]. 
Helin and Sandstrom [39] illustrate how a code of conduct ethics was resisted in the Swedish 
branch of a US company and find “resistance through distance” a more ambiguous and informal 
dimension of the concept of resistance. Resistance to induction, or positive power, is central to 
our study of certification scheme acceptance or rejection. A group of agencies – those proposing 
the scheme – attempt to induce others to adopt it.  
Although researchers in the field of organizational studies have begun to consider resistance as 
something less visible and more subtle, in the area of standardization and certification this 
perspective has not been explicitly applied. As we discuss in the next section, resistance and 
power are not single dimensional and observable phenomena. Power and resistance are 
intertwined with language, discourse, rules of meaning and membership as well with techniques 
of production and discipline. It is this multi-perspective that makes CoP such a powerful lens for 
analyzing our case. Our conceptualization of resistance as a multi-directional activity links to 
Rus’s [65] argument defining “power as a cyclical relationship of induction and resistance”  (p.7).  
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He argues for the need to move beyond the conventional dichotomy between induction and 
resistance to see resistance “not in negativity but rather in means, in the subject of power, or in 
rule of domination” (p.7). On the one hand, Rus recognizes the need for studying resistance 
related to discourses, but on the other, he acknowledges the complexity and difficulty of 
researching such phenomena.  
Accordingly, in the next section we introduce our theoretical lens, the CoP. In so doing we 
discuss its main concepts and argue its suitability as a lens for studying standards certification 
scheme creation. We begin by illustrating the perspective on tension and politics in 
standardization, and argue for the value of resistance analysis in this particular context.  
 
3. Theoretical Background 
3.1 Clegg’s Circuits of Power 
Clegg [16] conceives power as relational, i.e. power exists among two agents who are associated 
or connected in some way; it is the force that keeps social systems coherent. Therefore from this 
perspective an organization, understood as organized collective action, is the result of power. For 
Clegg power in organizational fields is manifested through the production of specific outcomes: 
tangible products or institutionalized practices. Organizational and social outcomes are possible 
as the result of relations among persons: relations sustained by power.  
Three perspectives on power are integrated into the three circuits of power. The first circuit, the 
circuit of episodic power, is defined by the relationship between two types of agents: As and Bs. 
The As make the Bs do something they would not do otherwise; note that if the Bs agree with the 
As’ wishes, then no power is exercised [32]. This view of power as conceived in the relation 
between As and Bs is similar to the one of induction as mentioned above. Clegg warns however 
that just looking into the circuit of episodic power is not enough to understand the power 
phenomenon. There is a need also to consider the conditions that secure access to and control of 
the resources that ensure compliance and allow As to have power over Bs: what Clegg calls the 
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standing conditions constituted by the other two circuits of power, social and systemic 
integration. This is the most evident of the circuits. In the case of studying the acceptance or 
rejection of standards we determine that the As in the relationship are those proposing the 
standard certification scheme while the prospective recipients of the scheme are the Bs. We can 
say, then that the As are inducing [65] the Bs to accept the scheme.   
The second circuit, the circuit of social integration, is composed principally of rules of meaning 
and rules of membership. The rules of meaning refer to how different groups interpret events and 
objects. This is closely related to the power of discourse described by Foucault, who indicates 
that power is exercised by virtue of how we interpret events and by what we believe to be true 
[31]. The rules of meaning are also related to the concept of legitimacy as defined by institutional 
theorists [57]: in effect the power to decide what is legitimate. The rules of membership refer to 
power originated by individuals’ association with particular groups. Groups, in this case, can be 
formal groups in an organization and, for example, hierarchical in nature, such as senior 
management, middle management and ordinary employees. Groups can also refer to public 
authorities and occupations such as police officers or doctors, whose power stems from their 
association with social institutions [30], or in the case of the manager, derived from the 
institutionalized manager-employee relationship that is underpinned by a legal contract. For the 
purposes of our study, the rules of meaning are related to the interpretation and legitimacy of the 
proposed scheme. When Bs resist the adoption of the certification scheme in terms of challenging 
its legitimacy, we call this resistance discursive [65].  
The third circuit, the circuit of system integration, refers to the material conditions such as the 
means of production and technologies which afford an organization the production of goods and 
services, as well as its surveillance practices. Although the interpretation of power provided by 
the first two circuits mentioned above is incisive, our understanding of the power relation 
between As and Bs should be complemented by consideration of the systemic integration circuit. 
The compliance of the Bs with organizational objectives ensures systemic integration. Systemic 
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integration here is understood to be a high degree of cohesiveness in an organization that permits 
the production of goods and services, and Clegg distinguishes two major concepts: techniques of 
discipline and techniques of production. The techniques of production refer to material means and 
procedures drawn on by organizations to generate goods and services, while the techniques of 
discipline refer to the measures and methods. In the employee example, the techniques of 
production refer to the definition of tasks in which employees are directed by managers while 
techniques of discipline would be used if an employee were to dissent from her managers’ 
wishes. When studying resistance to the certification scheme, the techniques of discipline refer to 
any means the agencies proposing the scheme might deploy to enforce the adoption. As presented 
in the case, these agencies lacked such resources giving rise to the difficulties encountered in 
promoting the certification scheme. This is similar to what Boström [10] refers as fundamental 
power resources for the acceptance of standards.  
The circularity of the framework is manifested when the repeated actions of Bs’ compliance 
become institutionalized and integrated into the other two circuits. Returning to the earlier 
employee example, after continuous repetition the practice of Bs reporting all their activities to 
As becomes an institutionalized technique of production and discipline. At the same time the 
institutionalization of this practice will also reinforce the social and working relations between As 
and Bs. Changes to the circuits of power are induced by exogenous contingencies; i.e. events that 
are outside the realm of an organizational field or an institutionalized practice. Thus, the CoP 
provides an appropriate theory of interpretation of our case because it integrates different 
theoretical perspectives. It allows us to analyze the certification process not only as a strategy for 
legitimation as suggested by institutional theory, but also to integrate contingent factors such as 
particular agents’ maneuvers and exogenous contingencies.  
4. Research Method 
Of the various research approaches, we consider that a case study is most suitable for this context 
for several reasons. First, the case study approach is suitable for studying processes – such as 
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c:cure’s implementation – in which context and actions are closely related [83]. Indeed prior 
research has demonstrated the value of a case study approach in analyzing the complexity of 
standardization and certification process [3, 15, 56]. Second, case studies enable theory 
development as part the result of an iterative relation between data and concepts [23].  In this 
study we use the CoP as the underlying framework to guide our fieldwork and reveal a richer 
picture of social phenomena in which there are different power actors engaged in the 
standardization and certification process. 
Fieldwork took place in summer 2001. Additional interview data was obtained in 2003 and 2004. 
While this case might be old, the example of power interaction remains relevant to the current 
standardization research. As Aggarwal et al. [1] contend, there is need to have a deeper analysis 
(such as the use of case study research) on “specific standard-setting situations” where 
stakeholders have different degrees of power” (ibid p.459). Our main method of data collection 
was semi-structured interviews with those involved in the development, marketing and 
administration of the certification scheme. We were able to gain good access to key actors in the 
scheme and 14 interviews were conducted. As Table 1 indicates, our interviewee represented the 
range of diverse interest groups involved in the c:cure scheme, ranging from the director of 
United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS), the head of the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) information security group, and head of security managers from different 
organizations. Given our focus was on the power dynamics among different stakeholders in 
standard and certification development process, we typically began with a broad question 
about their role related to the c:cure scheme development allowing us further questions on 
their interpretations of the proposed c:cure scheme and the actions taken by other 
stakeholders.  Each interview session lasted between 1 and 2 hours. The second source of data 
comes from desk-based research, public reports and documents provided by the interviewees 
concerning the scheme such as the c:cure survey by the British Standards Institute (BSI), the DIT 
report, and BSI study on BS 7799 accreditation and certification scheme.  
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Interviewee’s Position  Role in BS7799 and c:cure  
Director of development, UKAS representing UKAS on the  c:cure Steering 
Committee 
Chief executive, Association of British 
Certification Bodies (ABCB) 
a member of both BS7799 Accreditation Committee 
and  the c:cure Steering Committee 
Director, Independent Register of Certified 
Auditors (IRCA) 
representing IRCA on the  c:cure Steering Committee 
Head of enterprise performance practice, 
The System Company 
project manager for the c:cure development  
Former head of the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) security policy group 
(until 1999) 
responsible for driving the  c:cure scheme 
development until 1999 
IT security consultant A a member of both BS7799 Accreditation Committee 
and the c:cure Steering Committee 
Technical services manager, Lloyds 
Register of Quality Assurance (LRQA) 
represent LRQA during the  c:cure scheme 
consultation stage 
Deputy chairman, BS7799 users group represent BS7799 users group during the c:cure 
scheme consultation stage and after 
Business program manager, BSI Delivering 
Information Solution to Customer (DISC) 
Division 
a division in the British Standard Institute (BSI) 
responsible for managing and marketing the c:cure 
scheme 
IT security consultant B was commissioned to draw up a review of the c:cure 
scheme 
IT security consultant C first certified c:cure auditor 
Head of DTI security policy group (from 
1999) 
Responsible for BS7799 and certification program 
Head of security management in banking 
sector 
original contributor to BS7799 standard 
Senior security manager in retailing sector original contributor to BS7799 standard 
Table 1 : Summary of Interviewee Information 
4.1 Data Analysis 
The approach adopted for analyzing the data consisted in drawing on our theoretical framework 
to tease meanings out of the case narrative. In so doing we conducted a dialogical process 
between data and theory [48,81]. Rus [65] suggests that when analyzing the cyclical relationship 
of power comprising induction and resistance,  
The unit of analysis of power accordingly cannot be a thing, a person, an act, 
a relation, and also not a status, it can only be the entire context within which 
the dialectic of power takes place. 
 
This was fundamental for articulating our findings [23] and the analysis was conducted in three 
steps. The first step was to highlight key themes and major events that took place between 1995 
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and 2000. Case study notes were prepared containing the responses of the interviewees, 
summaries of the questions and answers, and comments on documents provided or physical 
observations. Key themes were then identified and discussed, at the same time; a chronology of 
the events was also developed. The second step was to derive the three circuits from the interview 
notes, documents and findings established in the previous episode. The objective was to identify 
the power agents, the resources and the meaning of membership that are significant in 
understanding the attempts to institutionalize the c:cure scheme.  The third step was to offer an 
in-depth analysis of the basis of the narrative. Although the information had been analyzed and 
discussed among three independent researchers, to validate our interpretations we decided to 
share them with the actors involved and fortunately a number of our interviewees offered their 
services for reading the manuscript and providing feedback. Overall, our informants validated our 
interpretations but where there was divergence we made explicit their views in our 
interpretations. 
 
5. The Case Study: The Resistance to C:cure 
In this section we present the case study along with our analysis. c:cure (a timeline of the events 
is presented in Table 2 below) was never adopted by a critical mass of organizations and was 
eventually withdrawn. The purpose of our analysis is to explain its failure from a power 
perspective and we identify how power struggles hindered the integration of the three circuits. 
We posit that the lack of integration in the three circuits of power, the result of resistance from 
different actors, the presence of contradicting discourses, and the lack of disciplinary techniques, 
ultimately explain why the scheme failed to be widely adopted. For purposes of clarity we have 
divided the case into three episodes. Each episode is followed by an analysis using each of the 
circuits of power.  
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Table 2: Chronology of Key Events 
Time  Description of Key Events 
1995 February  BS7799 Part 1 published 
1995 December BS7799 Industry Working Group submits draft for an accredited  
certification scheme 
1996 August Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) publishes its idea for scheme 
1996 Autumn  DTI commissions implementation plan for certification scheme 
1997 August DTI establishes BS7799 Accredited Certification Committee 
DTI establishes BS7799 Accredited Certification Committee 
1997 October BSI-DISC commissions an Accreditation and Certification Scheme 
Study 
1998 February BS7799 Part 2 published 
1998 April Minister for Small Firms, Trade and Industry announces launch of 
c:cure scheme 
1998 September c:cure auditor assessment and examination syllabus published 
1999 November Only 3 lead auditors, 4 auditors, 4 provisional auditors certified to act 
under c:cure scheme 
1999 December Only 3 certificates issued to organizations in 1999 
2000 March Review of c:cure scheme commissioned  
2000 July 10 certificates issued on c:cure scheme 
2000 October c:cure scheme discontinued 
 
 
5.1 Episode 1: Initiation of A BS7799 Certification Scheme 
To address the rising concern over the increasing number of information systems security 
breaches in the UK, in 1993 the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the British Standards 
Institute (BSI) and seven major UK companies joined forces to develop a document entitled A 
Code of Practice for Information Security Management. The code became the British standard 
BS7799 in 1995, transformed in 2001 into the international standard ISO/IEC 17799.  
Following the publication of BS7799, the idea of establishing a certification scheme gathered 
momentum. The original outline for certification against Part 2 of the BS7799 standard was 
drawn up by the BS7799 Industry Working Group and discussed at a public consultation 
workshop in December 1995. Shortly afterwards, this Group submitted a final draft for an 
accredited certification scheme to the DTI. Following the findings of the report, the DTI 
concluded that alongside the usual generic certification there was a special need for a second 
certification scheme for BS7799. Under this generic certification, the audit checks that establish 
the fitness of the applicant organization for certification against the BS7799 standard are 
performed by employees of an accredited certification body, such as one of the global 
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management consultancies. The accreditor organization receives accreditation, not the individuals 
performing the actual certification audits. In the c:cure scheme, however, the assessor/auditor 
must be personally assessed and accredited – a much more stringent check on the quality of the 
auditor performing the review, and it was argued that c:cure was therefore a higher quality 
certification. Both DTI and BSI considered that the requirement of “auditor competence” would 
be “sufficient to establish c:cure as the preferred BS7799 certification brand”. 
The chair of the BS7799 International User Group (IUG), later known as the Information Security 
Management Systems (ISMS) group, recalled the rationale behind the idea of c:cure: 
After publishing BS7799 in 1995, the Group (the BS7799 Industry 
Working Group) decided to look into the idea of certification. While 
working on Part 2 of the standard, the Group also started a pilot project 
looking at a certification scheme. UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation 
Service) wanted to have different schemes in order to maintain a 
competitive accreditation environment. 
 
In August 1996, the DTI published a document outlining its ideas on “certification against 
BS7799: Code of Practice for information security management” and a 1997 consultancy report 
set out a plan emphasizing the crucial nature of: 
• Speed to market (an interim scheme was proposed even whilst c:cure was being 
finalized) 
• Compliance with the ‘open market’ requirements of EN4500 and with the UKAS 
obligations in the international arena to earn mutual recognition. 
• Quantification of market demand for the scheme, in keeping with UKAS requirements 
Hence there were various stakeholders with different interests. UKAS, the body sitting at the 
apex of all accreditation in the UK, desired to see competition amongst schemes in order to 
stimulate demand for high quality certification. BSI, both as a certification body providing 
 14 
generic certification but also as the business manager for the c:cure certification scheme, stood in 
a rather ambiguous position. It did not want to forgo income from the generic certification yet as 
the premier UK standards body accepted the desire for a higher quality level of accreditation. 
However, for many potential applicant organizations the choice of two competing paths to 
certification against the same standard simply resulted in confusion, having the effect of 
preventing progress on developing security: which way was the right way to go?   
5.2 Analysis of First Episode Through the Lens of the CoP 
For the purposes of our analysis we start by identifying the As and Bs of a causal episodic 
relationship. The As are constituted by the DTI, the BSI and UKAS whose missions were to 
ensure the security of electronic trade and the creation of standards and certification schemes. The 
Bs of the power relationship are constituted by those British organizations interested in 
demonstrating that their information systems were secure. The prime objective of the As was to 
ensure that through the adoption of the c:cure scheme and therefore much better security, the 
growing information-based economy in the UK would thrive and prosper. To achieve their 
objectives the As were prepared to countenance the two competing certification schemes: (1) 
c:cure, a rigorous scheme provided by specialized auditors and  (2) the generic scheme offered by 
traditional consulting companies providing certification services. The As considered that 
competition between the two schemes would be fruitful. It would extend the coverage and 
enhance the quality of the implementation of the underlying standard (BS7799).  
From the perspective of social integration, we can appreciate the exercise of power in this circuit 
through the belief held by the As that offering two competing schemes would improve the quality 
and extent of certification of information security management. The dominant discourse here is 
the value of market forces and of competition in enhancing quality and engendering widespread 
adoption.  
Another salient discourse in the circuit of social integration was that of rigor and technical detail. 
According to this, the As believed that, given c:cure’s more stringent technical demands, the Bs 
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would consider c:cure to be superior to the generic scheme. Here the belief is that specialization 
and rigor are fundamental for the acceptance of a security management certification scheme. The 
dominant notion is that technical detail and specialization should be interpreted as values of the 
utmost importance. Hence, the As believed that c:cure would facilitate and nurture e-commerce 
by sending out to all a strong message of quality and trustworthiness. Thus, the analysis of this 
circuit identified two main discourses emanating from the As: (1) competition is valuable and (2) 
the quality of the scheme is directly proportional to its technical rigor.  
Through the lens of systemic integration, we identify that the most tangible technique in this 
circuit was the certification scheme itself. It consists in the auditing and issuance of a certificate 
of conformity with the information systems security management standard BS7799. The scheme 
can be considered a prime example of a technique of discipline and production. The As believed 
that the effectiveness of the scheme would rest on its detailed and rigorous content; i.e. 
organizations adopting the scheme would be able to claim more manifestly secure information 
systems. Moreover, the certification scheme was designed with the purpose of having a 
disciplinary effect, so that organizations would have to adopt it in order to demonstrate 
competence and legitimacy for practicing e-commerce. However, in embracing a market 
discourse the As forwent the deployment of disciplinary techniques to force the adoption of the 
certification scheme.  
 
5.3 Episode 2: Launch of C:cure Scheme 
In August 1997 the DTI established the BS7799 Accredited Certification Steering Committee and 
appointed BSI-DISC, a unit of BSI, as the scheme manager. This Committee consisted primarily 
of trade and professional representative bodies providing input to the scheme manager on the 
scheme’s development, marketing and funding.  
To demonstrate its commitment and determination to the BS7799 Accredited Certification 
Scheme, DTI allocated 1 million GBP to the project. This sum was allocated to contracts 
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undertaken by three organizations active in the standards certification business: Level-7, BSI-
DISC and the Systems Company1. A study contracted to the Systems Company by the c:cure 
scheme manager (BSI-DISC) in February 1998 identified the principal criteria, scheme protocols, 
and specific criteria for preliminary auditor registration and certification. The requirements held 
that the scheme should be credible, of demonstrable value, affordable, and self-funded. 
Mrs. Barbara Roche, the UK’s Minister for Trade and Industry, launched the c:cure scheme for 
certification in April 1998 at the Infosecurity Exhibition, where she emphasized the importance 
of organizations obtaining certification: 
[c:cure] aims to facilitate electronic commerce by allaying fears 
about security…… [certified organisations] to demonstrate that they 
have given serious consideration to all the security threats they face, 
and that they have put appropriate safeguards in place. 
 
In September 1998 the c:cure auditor assessment criteria and examination syllabus were 
published, underlining the high quality of the certification. Meanwhile, the DTI decided to 
establish the c:cure scheme as a fully self-funded program, i.e. no further funding from DTI. The 
c:cure Steering Committee concluded that the financial resources would be generated from three 
sources: the sale of BS7799 certification guides, the annual c:cure maintenance fee charged to 
certificate holders between full audits, and 12% of the relevant audit fee charged by the 
certification bodies to applicant organizations. One emerging paradox was that while a sub-unit 
of BSI (BSI-DISC) was the business manager for the scheme with key responsibility to promote 
c:cure, BSI also numbered as one of the vendors of the cheaper generic route to certification.  
Many industry practitioners accused the DTI and BSI of harboring unrealistic expectations about 
c:cure take-up and that optimistic targets would not be realized. The former head of the 
Information Security Policy Group at the DTI recalled that the target figures were “20-30 
                                                 
1 The names of the organization have been changed. 
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certificates in year 1 and 60 certificates in year 2, to keep in line with the ISO 9000 scheme”. By 
comparison, IRCA, the Independent Register of Certified Auditors, one of the certification bodies 
first accredited for the c:cure scheme, expected no more than 10 certificates to be issued before 
July 2000. Lloyds Register Quality Assurance (LRQA), another organization that became a 
certification body for c:cure, expected to issue no more than 2 certificates in the first year of the 
scheme. One problem was that some organizations (i.e. Bs) that might have been considered as 
potential scheme applicants had no need for certification.  A Chief Information Security Officer 
in the banking sector explained:  
The success of BS7799 could not really be measured by the number 
of certifications since many companies see no need for certification 
despite using BS7799 for its company. For example, at my 
company, there is always contractual agreement between the partner 
about complying security management matching BS7799 standard 
or its equivalent. The contractual agreement gave my company the 
right of audit if necessary, hence, there is no need for requesting 
partners to acquire certification. 
Several organizations (i.e. Bs) viewed their participation as reluctant or passive rather than 
voluntary and active. For example, IRCA described the process of  their involvement as one of 
being “dragged kicking and screaming” into the scheme – in other words, there was considerable 
pressure placed on them by the government to become a c:cure certification body. UKAS, 
likewise, complained of being pressured to participate in the scheme. As one interviewee told us,  
as the consultation forum of the c:cure scheme continues, our participation was 
primarily characterized as passive or absent. 
The lack of strong industry support was reflected in a number of industry surveys that showed 
that there were still many businesses in the UK entirely unaware of the security management 
standard, let alone any certification scheme. The annual Business Information Security Survey 
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1998 found that only 25% of its 1000 respondents (covering manufacturing, public and service 
organizations) had even heard of BS7799 and only 5% were planning to seek certification at 
some stage.  
5.4 Analysis of Second Episode Through the Lens of the CoP 
The circuit of social integration draws our attention to discourses and how they are interpreted. In 
our case we identify a prominent discourse influencing As’ actions and their corresponding 
interpretations. It derives from economic rationality, linking and emphasizing the role of market 
forces and their legitimacy. This was expressed in the report from the Systems Company 
consultants, suggesting that the c:cure scheme should be credible and affordable. The first 
required attribute of credibility, legitimacy, related to the belief that the scheme had been 
prepared by reputable industry experts. The second attribute, affordability, on the other hand 
centered on the economic rationality of the scheme. The rationale was that the cost had to be 
lower than its value or, as suggested in the literature, that the costs could be transferred to 
customers [38,61]. 
There are contradictory interpretations regarding the legitimacy of the As’ alliance. To buttress 
their argument for the legitimacy of the c:cure scheme, the As announced that the scheme had 
been prepared “in consultation with industry”; this was the main discourse of legitimacy for the 
scheme. The Bs may have interpreted this to mean that if the scheme had been prepared “in 
consultation with industry”, then it would follow that most relevant organizations would adopt it: 
the dynamics of mimetic forces. However, most Bs did not believe that the scheme had been 
genuinely prepared “in consultation with industry”. Our data shows that organizations were aware 
that arm-twisting had been applied and were unconvinced by the arguments for the c:cure 
scheme. Thus the discourse of the As identified here is that the certification scheme was 
formulated in “consultation with industry”, and hence legitimate, while for the Bs the scheme was 
an imposition, expensive and complex. 
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 From the point of view of the circuit of systemic integration, we observe that the method of 
hiring consultants as a technique to achieve As’ objectives was resorted to constantly throughout 
the case. Consultants were hired with the purpose of conducting a study to determine the 
feasibility of the more specialized certification scheme. The report emphasized that such a 
scheme had to be launched quickly and comply with national and international requirements for 
that type of certification. More importantly, the report stated that before its creation and launch 
the DTI and its allies had to ensure that there was enough demand in the market. Our data shows 
that the As moved ahead with their plan because of their strong belief in the value of having two 
competing schemes and in the technical virtues of c:cure. Then after making the decision to go 
ahead with the new scheme, the As hired another consulting firm. The task of these consultants 
was to design the content of the scheme as well as its plan of implementation. Accordingly, the 
consultants’ report specified the scheme’s protocols and its auditing requirements. The over-
reliance of the As on the technique of hiring consultants bears some reflection. First, the reports 
did not show how the attributes (credibility and affordability) that were stated as key to the 
success of the scheme would be clear to prospective certificate applicants: how a more rigorous 
scheme requiring specialized auditors would be worth the extra expense. As one interviewee told 
us, “firms have spent too much money on getting certification for ISO 9000 and other purpose. In 
this case (security management), it was more important to have security policy in place within the 
organization, the issue of security certification was not really important.” Second, the reports 
never warned the DTI about the risks of having two competing certification schemes - the 
potential ambiguity and confusion created by having two schemes was not foreseen. Third, one of 
the consultants’ reports presented an over-optimistic forecast for demand for c:cure certificates. 
Finally, once the impending demise of the scheme became evident, it was a consultant report that 
recommended abandoning it. Following this kind of advice hardly ensured a coherent and 
consistent approach for the As. 
5.5 Episode 3: Road to Discontinuation of C:cure Scheme 
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Despite the 500 auditor information packs issued and 40 applications submitted in June 1999, the 
rosy start for c:cure soon began to fade. By November 1999, only 3 lead auditors, 4 auditors and 
4 provisional auditors had been certified under the scheme. The certification scheme manager 
BSI-DISC voiced regret about the insistence on such rigorous auditor assessment: “the entire 
auditor registration process turned out to be a frustrating bottleneck”.  
Another senior information security consultant confirmed the clash of cultures when recalling the 
experience of his interview for accreditation as a c:cure auditor: 
 
I had one interview by two security experts and a member of IRCA 
who was an ISO 9000 auditor. The interview descended to farce 
when the ISO 9000 person said that he could not understand why 
there was no client names, given on my application, for whom I had 
worked. I stated that my contract did not permit me to divulge any 
client details at all, whereupon he said that he had never heard of 
this in his whole ISO 9000 experience. 
 
More disquiet emerged. A keenly felt problem was the cost of c:cure certification. Rigorous 
auditor assessment inevitably added to the cost of the certification bodies, which subsequently 
passed the cost on to the companies seeking c:cure certificates. One consultant told us,  
When I was in the National Computing Centre, only 1 client was 
ready to go ahead with certification. There were another 3 initially 
preparing for the process, but then all decided to drop out after the 
cost and unclear business benefits. The cost was too huge for SMEs. 
The certification is valid for 3 years. The company needs to have 
pre-audit preparation and then pass 5 steps of surveillance 
programs. All these probably would cost a firm between 3,000 and 
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5,000 (GBP). It is very difficult to justify this to the top 
management 
 
Indeed, two of the scheme’s certification bodies, IRCA and LRQA openly complained about 
making losses and both blamed the rigorous assessment for c:cure auditor accreditation. Owing 
to the small numbers of auditors being certified, IRCA declared it was not able to generate 
sufficient income from its own triennial registration fee. LRQA was expecting to recover its 
investment and obtain a additional revenue stream from c:cure certifications once the scheme 
started to operate. But the anticipated demand for c:cure certification never materialized.   
Even outside the UK, the c:cure scheme was negatively received. The chair of the BS7799 
International User Group told us that even among the groups that were supporters of the BS7799 
standard, one country strongly objected to the proprietary and localized (i.e. UK) nature of the 
c:cure certification scheme and that they “point blank refused to support it”. The head of DTI 
Information Security Policy Group also commented, 
It is rather an absurd idea. On the one hand we are promoting the 
internationalization of the standard, on the other hand we are 
developing a certification that is localized. This does not make 
sense. 
 
This Group head also told us that he attended a c:cure Steering Committee meeting on the very 
first day of his appointment in late 1998, and concluded that c:cure was going nowhere: 
I knew that we had to finish c:cure after I heard a comment from 
UKAS. The person told me that they cannot really stop certification 
organizations issuing BS7799 certificates. So what is the value of 
c:cure which costs even more than a generic certificate?  
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In 1999, the first c:cure certificates were awarded to just 3 organizations. By early 2000, in the 
light of the continuing low levels of applications, the Steering Committee commissioned a 
consultant to undertake a review of the c:cure scheme. By the time of the first draft, only 10 
c:cure certificates had been issued. The final version of the report was circulated to the Steering 
Committee members in August and at their meeting in October 2000 the members agreed to 
discontinue the scheme, citing “confusion between c:cure and non c:cure certification as well as 
low market take up”. 
5.6 Analysis of Third Episode Through the Lens of the CoP 
At the end of the case we observe that very few Bs were enrolled wholeheartedly into the As 
plans. Our analysis shows that none of the circuits of power achieved integration and here we 
summarize the main reasons. First, British organizations did not adopt the scheme in large 
numbers. Second, few industry experts responded to the call made by the steering committee to 
join the ranks of auditors conducting the scheme assessments. Third, those organizations which 
had joined the steering committee of c:cure, i.e. the members of the As’ alliance, harbored 
serious doubts about the viability of the scheme and remained in the committee only with 
reluctance.  
By scrutinizing the circuits of social integration and episodic power we observe that the meanings 
assigned by the As to the scheme were not the same as those assigned by the Bs. For example, the 
As’ strategy of two competitive schemes was interpreted differently by the Bs: they were 
eventually confused by the choice of two schemes. The discourse espoused by the As was that the 
scheme was legitimate and rigorous, while for the Bs the scheme was confusing and onerous. 
What is interesting here is to notice how the discourse of the Bs prevailed over that of the As 
since, most Bs chose not to adopt either scheme until the confusion had been cleared. As 
discussed below, we call resilience this property of a discourse that prevails over a competing 
one. In a similar manner, international bodies were also confused by the presence of two 
certification schemes and followed the same course of action as their British counterparts; i.e. 
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they adopted a policy of wait and see. In addition, prospective auditors interpreted the content of 
the scheme not as being more sophisticated and attractive, as the As intended, but as too difficult 
and complicated. We note here the resilience of Bs discourse, which prevails over that of the As.   
One outcome of these disparate interpretations, of these contradicting discourses, was a smaller 
than expected pool of suitably accredited auditors. Worse still, industry saw the c:cure accredited 
auditors not as experts and specialists but, in some cases, as consultants of dubious quality 
converted in an ad-hoc manner from other kinds of auditing into security auditors. Nor did the Bs 
recognize the economic benefits, as the As had expected, of adopting a more expensive scheme 
when a cheaper rival (the generic option) was also available. Many Bs, retail banks for instance, 
through their bilateral contractual relations with suppliers were still able to ensure compliance 
with BS7799 to the satisfaction of their commercial partners without needing to be certified. The 
direct competition from the generic scheme, as well as the availability of other ways in which to 
enforce and demonstrate compliance with the standard, undermined the credibility of the 
discourse espoused by the As that c:cure was economically viable. The analysis of the case from 
the lens of the social integration circuit reveals the reasons for the actions of As and Bs. The 
organizations that were supposed to accept the discourses associated with the scheme: technical 
sophistication, economic viability and widespread industry acceptance – not only rejected those 
discourses, but also countered them with alternative discourses; that the certification scheme was 
confusing, onerous and localized (UK centered). 
Analysis through the lens of the circuit of systemic integration shows that a constant theme in the 
case was the As’ deployment of market-driven techniques. This was evident in the decision to 
allow market competition, eventually a major reason for confusion because the existence of 
competition drew attention to the commercial infeasibility of c:cure. With two certification 
schemes in the market, British organizations could compare the costs of one scheme against the 
other. Market estimates calculating the demand for c:cure might well have been off-target 
because they may have not considered the impact and availability of the other certification 
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scheme. Furthermore, market estimates could have failed to factor in the existence of contractual 
relations between organizations that forced them in any case to comply with BS7799. In addition, 
the DTI overestimated the demand from prospective auditors to be enrolled and accredited into 
the scheme.  
The analysis of the case from the perspective of the systemic integration circuit highlights the 
failure of the techniques adopted by the As. By over-depending on consultants and market 
studies, the As underestimated the challenges in designing and implementing a rigorous and 
proprietary scheme that had to compete with another which was generic and more affordable. 
Surprisingly, the most glaring mistake made by the As consisted in the techniques that they did 
not deploy. For example, a technique of discipline that could have worked might have been the 
introduction of specific legislation or regulation, making c:cure obligatory for conducting 
electronic trading in the UK. Such a regulation would have been a coercive force that eventually 
might have eventually triggered the widespread adoption of the scheme. Yet, in the case of c:cure 
it did not happen, perhaps to be expected given the strong market orientation. Indeed, there are 
several general lessons that can be drawn from this analysis and they form the main topic of the 
next section.  
 
6. Discussion 
In this section we discuss the implications of our study. The discussion is structured around the 
insights derived from our analysis and by the CoP. The underlying assumption is that c:cure was 
a technique of production proposed by the As to alter the current circuits of power of the 
organizational field comprised of British organizations interested in information systems security. 
In our discussion we also articulate the main contributions of our paper: formulating the concept 
of discourse resilience to explain resistance in the circuit of social integration, reflecting on the 
power struggles to determine legitimacy and establishing the role of non-agentic resistance in the 
absence of facilitative power. These theoretical implications are not generalized to predict which 
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competing standards win, rather they are analytical generalization focusing on contributions to 
the extent body of knowledge of standards and certification scheme [52, 81].  
6.1 Resistance from Resilient Discourses  
We found that resistance to the introduction of c:cure arose from prevailing discourses in the 
circuit of social integration, specifically in the extant rules of meaning. The discourse with which 
the As promoted the scheme was one of technical rigor. However, the Bs of the relation did not 
accept this discourse because they interpreted it through a simple economic discourse: the scheme 
was too expensive and confusing. Organizations, the Bs of the power relation, interpreted the 
proposal of the As with the rules of meaning prevailing in the extant circuits of power; that of 
market economy in which the principle of total utility [41] prevailed: i.e. given the availability of 
a generic certificate that was enough to convey compliance and that at the same time cost less, the 
need for a higher quality certificate was not justified for the Bs. As our case shows, eventually the 
market economy discourse prevailed. The marginal utility discourse, that prefers low cost, 
resisted the discourse of technical rigor and developed in consultation with industry. Despite the 
As efforts the Bs did not change their interpretation. 
The resilience of the marginal utility discourse over other discourses in a market of standards and 
certification can also be found in other empirical research [63,53]. Reinecke et. al. [63] suggest, 
for example, that in case of the presence of multiple certification organizations will tend to 
choose the most economic option to avoid higher costs. Their findings are related to our research, 
as the cost of c:cure was one of the main reasons given for its non-adoption. Lee and Oh [53] 
studied the failure of the Chinese government in promoting WAPI as the standard of wireless 
networking and one main reason for its non-adoption was its higher cost in comparison with its 
main competitor WiFi. We conclude that in the absence of facilitative power exercised by the As, 
the dominant discourse in the circuits of power will tend to prevail. Facilitative power here refers 
to deploying techniques of discipline to ensure compliance. 
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In cases where the resilience of a current discourse is strong, the As may consider deploying 
techniques of discipline. The resilience of an extant discourse can be weakened through the 
promotion of different rules of meaning but, we argue, it will still require the exercise of 
facilitative power as in the case of ecological friendly and environmental sustainability 
discourses, in which public opinion is not enough to induce structural changes in organizational 
fields. For example, Sarkar and Young [67] found that organizations are reluctant to adopt 
“green” IT because of its high costs; despite acknowledging the positive effects this technology 
may have in the environment. We conjecture that had the British Government introduced 
regulations supporting c:cure, certification would have been widely adopted and changes to the 
circuits would have stabilized over time. Our findings are contributions in that they qualify the 
widespread belief that the adoption of a new practice requires a combination of coercive, mimetic 
and normative forces [21]. When proposing changes in extant circuits of power with resilient 
discourses, organizations may not rely only on dispositional power – i.e on discourses; changes 
may not be implemented without deploying facilitative (coercive) power. 
Examples of the need for facilitative power for introducing change in organizational fields have 
been documented widely in the literature. For example, Guler et al. [36] found that governmental 
bodies and multinationals apply coercive power effectively in the diffusion of quality 
management certificates. For example, the European Union has played a key role in requiring 
firms, especially new market entrants, to seek ISO 9000 certification, while the Singapore 
government mandates it for large construction firms wishing to register to undertake public-sector 
projects [59]. The coercive pressure for conformity plays a fundamental role in the diffusion of 
new organizational practices or strategies. We argue that without coercive power and if left to the 
market those proposed standards and certifications may have not been adopted. 
Moreover, we hold that there is a relationship between time and the resilience of a discourse. We 
argue that the resilience of discourses will be stronger the longer they have been the dominant 
discourse in the circuits of power. In our case the market economy (principle of marginal utility) 
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has been the prevailing rule of meaning in British businesses for many years. Indeed, the 
marginal utility principle lies at the core of any market economy and has done for centuries  [69]. 
Similar observations have been made by other researchers [80,22]. For example, Vermeulen et. 
al. [80] found that the Dutch government, in its attempt to create a market in the construction 
industry, failed to change the core beliefs in a market that had existed since the 19th century. 
Dokko et. al. [22] in a similar fashion suggest the resilience of discourses through time, as they 
explain technological change in organization fields from an evolutionary perspective. They 
explain the resistance to change in systems from the point of view of punctuated equilibrium: that 
systems tend to remain stable for long periods of time until change is introduced by disruptive 
contingencies [78,34,66].  
The notion of resilience is intimately connected to that of legitimacy which the literature 
recognizes as a fundamental and necessary attribute for the adoption of a standard or a 
certification scheme [63,30,69,3,38,52]. Timmermans and Epstein [77] in their study of a 
resistance movement for altering the practices of standardizing human beings in biomedicine 
research observe that neither certificates nor standards can be adopted when they are deemed to 
have no legitimacy. Researchers have also pointed out the centrality of the discourse of 
legitimacy for the adoption of information security certification [44,51,43]. Instead of explaining 
adoption in terms of economic benefits, these researchers explore the sources of conformity and 
the organizational consequences of implementing certification. Accordingly, these studies have 
shown that holding a recognized certificate increases a firm’s legitimacy, i.e. its good reputation 
and trustworthiness [4,46,62]. This institutionalization, they argue, is mainly the result of mimetic 
forces [20] whereby the firm imitates the practices of successful, dominant organizations. Our 
contribution here is to show what happens when two certificate schemes with dissimilar 
discourses compete. We discovered that the dominant one in the current circuits of power, i.e. the 
more resilient one, will prevail.  
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6.2 Non- Agentic Resistance 
Our study also demonstrates that in the absence of disciplinary techniques, resistance to change in 
the circuits is not only offered by agencies but also by discourses. As observed above, in the 
absence of systemic power, disputes will occur between discourses. That is not to say that the 
discourses acted on their own, as clearly they achieved it through different agencies: government 
authorities, consultants, auditors and managers, just to mention some. What we observed, though, 
is that agencies seem not to be responding to personal interests but to be defending what they 
thought was rational and true [30,32]. It was in this sense that we say that the discourses were the 
ones offering resistance. In our case, the competing discourses were marginal utility (low cost) 
against a discourse of quality (technical rigor and “in consultation with industry”).  
In our case we found that the As favored a technocratic discourse as they thought that 
competition between certificates would be based on quality. The belief in the superiority of the 
technocratic discourse was crystallized in the DTI’s conviction that the more technical and 
rigorous the scheme the more attractive it would be for organizations. This is an example of what 
Andrew Feenberg [25], the critical theorist of technology, calls technocracy, that is, the 
conviction that given its intricacies, technology development and its diffusion should be the 
responsibility of technical experts. The technocratic perspective of the DTI is also reflected in its 
over-reliance on consultants. Consultants were seen as experts in market studies and were also 
considered to be experts in financial matters. The DTI paid more attention to what the consultants 
were saying in respect of the market for c:cure than to the opinions of other members of the 
committee. Had the technocrats of the DTI questioned the strength of its technological discourse, 
they might not only have prevented the failure of c:cure but also saved at least one million British 
Pounds. The over-reliance of the DTI on consultants and its failure sufficiently to heed key users 
reduced the chances of useful early feedback.  
The non-agentic power of discourses and its relation to technological change is noted, for 
example, by Knights and McCabe [49]. In their study of Total Quality Management (TQM) 
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programs Knights and McCabe, reflecting on the views of power of Foucault and Lukes, point 
out that power has to be understood beyond mere actions and highlight the relevance of the power 
of discourse. In their study they notice the non-agentic power of discourses that provide TQM 
programs with a sense of inevitability in fostering legitimacy in an organizational field. Similarly, 
in studying resistance in public management service, Thomas and Davis [75] challenge the 
dominant view of resistance as passive and behavioral, and argue for focusing on meanings and 
symbolic interpretation. Our contribution is to identify the circumstances in which non-agentic 
resistance will be predominant, that is when agencies promote changes in circuits of power 
without deploying facilitative power, but just through competition of discourses in a market 
economy. 
7. CONCLUSION  
In this research, we investigate the dynamics of institutionalizing an information security 
certification scheme in the UK.  Our analysis raises important practical issues about both the 
creation and diffusion of certification schemes. As highlighted in the discussion, technical 
superiority does not necessarily hold sufficient attraction for the early adopters, and simplicity 
with broader collective objectives can become determining factors in the game of survival 
between two competing schemes. This study found that where two discourses compete, the more 
resilient discourse, the one more deeply rooted in the current circuits of power is the one that 
prevails: the market discourse takes precedence over that of technology. Furthermore our study 
confirms the role of the non-agentic resistance of discourses: discourses themselves compete 
when agencies may not be consciously resisting but rather merely defending what they see as 
rational and true. Our study once again underlines the critical importance of legitimacy in the 
standards and certification field. The two schemes were rooted in two different legitimacies, the 
technical rigor of c:cure against the international and low-cost nature of the generic certification 
scheme. Instead of technical rigor, market legitimacy won the day, underlining the power of a 
prevailing legitimacy.  
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In terms of practical implications, our findings related to circuit of systemic integration suggest 
that government or any agency promoting the adoption of a certification scheme may consider 
that in cases of low legitimation, coercive power may be the only way to ensure adoption. As 
coercive power is rarely deemed viable, especially in market economies and democratic societies, 
our study suggest that agencies proposing certification schemes should pay careful attention to 
and make efforts to strengthen the legitimacy of their proposal. For information security 
standards, our empirical study shows that potential adoptors still consider market legitimacy and 
logic as a determining factor in their evaluation of standard adoption.  Over-reliance on technical-
featured legitimacy could potentially lead to a failure in diffusing a new security technology 
standard.  
In terms of research limitations, perhaps, the CoP does not function quite so well in a fluid 
situation when agents do not remain in the same role over time.  In particular it may not be 
able to explain power relations when the clear distinction between As and Bs fails to apply or 
when there are changes in alliances such as As becoming Bs and vice-versa.  In our data the 
BSI is an important standards player in the UK, but it also has a department  of its 
organization (BSI-DISC) which was the business manager for the c:cure certification scheme 
business but also sold generic certification.  This was an example of the overlapping of 
boundaries with a lack of clear distinction about whether an organization can be deemed 
irrefutably an A or a B. 
 Another limitation of the CoP that we found in our analysis is the mechanistic nature of the 
Obligatory Passage Point concept. This is clear metaphor for As who try to make Bs do 
something they otherwise would not do.   Whilst this is useful as an indicator of when power 
is being exerted,  there may be different interpretations about what may be obligatory.  In our 
case the passing of regulation requiring organizations to acquire certification would have 
been a clear obligatory passage point.  In our data though we find that the Bs were always 
able to decline certification, and c:cure in particular, because although demonstrating security 
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was useful, it was not at the time necessary.  So what was the passage point that ultimately 
failed?  The failures were several and not just one. 
In conclusion, this study has shown the contingent nature of the stabilization or 
institutionalization of a security certification scheme. We argue that the fate of a scheme will 
depend on the resistance in and around the different stakeholders. Although the area of standards 
and certification is broad because it encompasses different traditions – economic, institutional and 
critical – we hope our study constitutes a contribution to those literatures. We believe the political 
perspective for studying stabilization is an approach from which researchers can learn. This paper 
constitutes an effort in that direction. 
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Appendix A:  Comparison between Generic Certification Scheme and c:cure 
 Generic Certification Scheme c:cure Scheme 
Applicable Countries  Global UK only 
Scheme oversight 
 
The European co-operation 
for Accreditation EA7/03 
document, recognized and 
accepted internationally   
c:cure accreditation scheme, accepted 
within the U.K. 
Standards adopted for 
certification  
BS 7799  BS 7799  
Validity of certificate Initial validity for 3 years  Initial validity for 3 years 
Accreditation Body 
 
United Kingdom 
Accreditation Services 
(UKAS) 
United Kingdom Accreditation Services 
(UKAS)  
Certification Bodies 
 
Required to be accredited by 
UKAS, but can be operated 
both in the U.K. and other 
countries 
 
Required to be accredited by UKAS, 
operated only in the U.K. 
 
Auditor assessment 
 
No mandatory requirements Required for independent c:cure auditor 
competence assessment organised by 
Independent Register of Certified 
Auditor (IRCA) 
 
Cost 
 
Depends on  
• the number of existing 
controls implemented; 
• the size of the organization; 
• the numbers of sites 
audited; 
• the cost of the certificate 
itself; 
• the daily rate of assessor. 
Depends on  
• the number of existing controls 
implemented; 
• the size of the organization; 
• the numbers of sites audited; 
• the cost of the certificate itself; 
• the daily rate of assessor. 
However, the daily rate of assessor will 
normally be higher than the generic 
scheme because of additional auditor 
assessment cost.  
 
